Twenty years have passed since the US-led invasion of Iraq toppled Saddam Hussein’s dictatorship. The political class that came to power in Iraq with a promise to abolish the authoritarianism of the Ba’athist regime and uphold democratic values has failed to deliver on that promise.
In fact, it has used the same oppressive tactics Saddam deployed to protect the ethno-sectarian power-sharing system known as “muhasasa ta’ifia” established after 2003 that protects his narrow political and economic interests.
The biggest challenge to this system came in 2019 when Iraqis took to the streets en masse to demand political and economic change that mirrored the promises made to them in the 2000s. The reaction of the political class was merciless. It has unleashed a deadly wave of violence and, under the current administration, has sought to use all legal and legislative means to further strengthen its repressive grip on power and quell dissent.
Iraqis are fighting to have a voice
The US-led invasion of Iraq was based on the idea that removing Saddam would allow democracy to flourish and respect for human and civil rights. But even the 2005 constitutionwritten by exiled Iraqi politicians and foreign allies who made these promises contains vague wording, making it easy to violate civil rights.
For example, it says that freedom of expression is guaranteed, but only if it does not infringe on “morality” or “public order”. This, of course, has allowed for the indiscriminate and indiscriminate use of this provision to silence Iraqi media and government critics.
The silence of critical voices and the use of political violence has enabled the Iraqi political elite to rule as it pleases and to enrich itself on the backs of the Iraqi people.
But replacing one oppressor with another is not something the Iraqi people were willing to accept. As far back as 2011, as the entire Middle East was in turmoil trying to end dictatorships and oppression, Iraqis took to the streets against their new rulers’ inability to provide basic services and a decent standard of living.
In the following years, protests continued as the political and economic situation in the country deteriorated.
In October 2019, years of accumulated anger erupted into mass protests in central and southern Iraq. Hundreds of thousands of people demonstrated for weeks, demanding not only a dignified life, but also an overhaul of the country’s failed political system. The protests also raised issues of freedom of expression and human rights, raising awareness of its critical importance.
Despite deadly violence against the protests by state and non-state actors, the demonstrations continued. The nationwide solidarity they received was a major blow to the political elite, which thrives on sowing division and perpetuating a culture of fear. It also led to an electoral defeat in 2021 of the parties inciting violence against the demonstrators.
Crackdown on freedom of expression
The political forces chastised by Iraqi voters in the last parliamentary election for their corruption and participation in the crackdown on the 2019 protests came back with a vengeance last year.
They formed a coalition known as the Shia Coordination Framework (SCF) and after the withdrawal of Shiite leader Muqtada al-Sadr’s bloc from parliament, which won the largest number of votes, they were able to exploit certain constitutional provisions to comply with to come to power.
The SCF joined Sunni parties and the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) to form the state administration coalition and control parliament. Since then, the group has launched what can only be described as a “counter-revolution” against significant gains made after the October 2019 protests.
The SCF-led government has limited the space for free expression and criticism. Articles 225-227 of the Penal Code, which were used extensively by the Baathist regime, are used targeting civil rights activists simply because they express their views on social media or in traditional media. She contain vague and broad language that allows the Iraqi authorities to prosecute and sentence anyone who insults “the government”, “military forces” or “semi-official bodies” to seven years in prison.
A notable example of how these articles have been misused recently is the case of activist Haider al-Zaidi. He was convicted to three years in prison in December for a tweet criticizing Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, the late head of the Popular Mobilization Forces, who was killed in a US drone strike in January 2020 along with Qassem Soleimani, head of the Quds Force in the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corp.
In March, political analyst Mohammed Na’naa’ arrested for criticizing Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani, while journalist Qudus al-Samaraie was sentenced to a year in prison for defamation after a senior military officer brought a lawsuit against her. These are just a few examples of a growing number of silent public figures who dare to criticize the political elite and the status quo.
In addition, the Ministry of the Interior also established a commission to punish anyone who posts “indecent content” online under Article 403 of the Penal Code, which covers another vague term – “public morals”. As a result of this article, individuals can be sentenced to up to two years in prison for violating a standard determined solely by the ministry’s subjective view of morality.
In February that was more than 10 people arrested based on Article 403, including social media influencers such as Aboud Skaiba, who was later released after a public outcry, and Assal Hossam, who received a two-year prison sentence.
The Supreme Court of Justice, a supposedly independent judicial body, has recently come forward support of the Ministry of the Interior‘s recent attempt to prosecute individuals for “insulting state institutions”.
Restrict political participation
One of the main gains made by the 2019 protests was the passage of a new electoral law. It enabled the new political forces to organize and challenge the status quo, and as a result about 30 candidates representing these groups entered parliament.
The political elite saw this as a threat to its monopoly of power. After the formation of a new government, the SCF pressed for amendments to the electoral law, introducing a method of calculating electoral votes that favors the parties of the established political class. There was so much opposition to this reform that parliament had to vote on it overnight and security forces removed lawmakers who protested against it.
By empowering the dominant ethno-sectarian parties, the amended law solidifies the current failed political system and undermines Iraq’s democratic path. It also goes against the shared national identity, which the 2019 protests were behind.
Although it has been 20 years since Saddam’s regime came to an end, the road to democracy in Iraq remains elusive. Still, it is very much worth fighting for. Although they have suffered many setbacks and face a formidable foe – a political class clinging to power by any means necessary – the Iraqis must continue their struggle. The 2019 protests and the gains made – albeit short-lived – have shown the way.
The Iraqi people must continue to push for civil rights, such as freedom of speech, fair elections and accountability, and keep these issues in the public eye to deter those who want to establish a new dictatorship. Even if progress is slow or met with resistance, Iraqis should not lose hope. Change is possible and inevitable. And this time it will not be exiled Iraqi politicians and their foreign allies leading it, but young Iraqis and civil society activists.
The views expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the editorial view of Al Jazeera.