In just six months, China has made great diplomatic progress in two regions the United States considers vital: the Middle East and Eastern Europe.
In November, Beijing signed a deal with Doha to supply liquefied natural gas for 27 years – the longest deal to date, which came about as the US’s European allies struggled to secure their own gas supplies. In February it presented a “peace plan” to end the war in Ukraine, positioning itself as a powerful mediator.
And then, in early March, China brokered a rapprochement between Saudi and Iran, leading to the restoration of full diplomatic relations between the two archenemies.
All this, of course, has left Americans quite worried, especially about their Gulf allies’ involvement with Beijing.
But Washington must acknowledge that its own diplomatic decision-making under the Obama administration, with its “pivot to Asia”, raised fears in the region of a US exit.
And not only the Gulf states are concerned. In a personal communication with one of the authors, a former European Union ambassador to Iraq referred to the lack of Western involvement in Iraq as a “catastrophic oversight” with “high costs” and said that “China is now building partnerships with Iran, Saudi Arabia Arabia, the UAE and other regional players in an attempt to occupy the vacuum left by the West.
The Americans are struggling to prove that the “pivot to Asia” would not mean diminished influence in the Gulf. But Washington shouldn’t get too obsessed with the region’s relationship with China, which remains fairly superficial. Instead, it should be more concerned about Israel’s involvement with Beijing and the destabilizing role it is playing in the region.
Indeed, trade volumes between China and the Gulf have increased in recent years. Four of the six Gulf Cooperation Council states now have significantly greater bilateral trade with China than with the US. This could be of concern to Washington, but it should understand that China’s energy needs remain central to China-Gulf relations.
In other words, these relationships are primarily transactional rather than strategic.
The recent China-brokered Saudi-Iran deal could mean China is trying to transcend this nature of the relationship and compete with the US for regional influence, but it will be very challenging to surpass the status of the US.
The US remains the main security partner of the Gulf and maintains multifaceted relations with the Gulf states, encompassing not only trade, but also close military, diplomatic, cultural, educational and social ties.
The hasty abandonment of the Chinese military base in the UAE after an intervention from Washington in 2021 reflects this reality.
In contrast, Israel has maintained substantial technological cooperation with China since the 1980s. There are even allegations that Israeli companies have sold sensitive high-tech military equipment to Beijing, although sales have reportedly stopped under US pressure.
Yet Israel has continued to sell spyware to Chinese authorities and has welcomed large Chinese investments in its technology sector, which amounted to $325 million in 2018. For a long time, Israeli authorities have not regulated investments in companies involved in dual-use technology. production, which has made Washington nervous.
Trade relations between China and Israel have flourished, especially under the leadership of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. In 2021, bilateral trade will reach $22.8 billion. Chinese companies also won tenders for major infrastructure projects, such as a strategic port near Haifa, which worried US defense officials because of the potential for Chinese espionage on US naval vessels docked there.
The Chinese and Israeli governments are also negotiating a free trade agreement; if signed, it will be the first in the Middle East.
In other words, Israel is far ahead of the Gulf in the depth of its relations with China and has engaged in practices that are potentially far more threatening to US interests than the energy deals the Gulf states have made with Beijing.
Moreover, Israel has played a role in spoiling regional stability. It has fueled tensions with Iran and encouraged conflict. It has also been involved in attacks on Iranian soil and attempted to undermine the nuclear deal with Iran, which the US has taken great pains to negotiate.
Given Washington’s own efforts to reach an agreement with Tehran, the Saudi-Iranian deal brokered by China should not be viewed in a negative light.
If the US wants to curb Chinese influence in the region, it should look to Israel, not the Gulf. Its involvement in the region, on the other hand, would benefit from clear affirmations of its reliability as an ally and respect for the internal dynamics and economic aspirations of the Gulf States.
It would be wise for the Americans to start talking to the Arabs as they talk to the Israelis – as equal partners.
The views expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the editorial view of Al Jazeera.