The staggering toll US failure in Afghanistan had on taxpayers is laid bare by government auditor

The US failure in Afghanistan was caused by a system that rewarded generals, diplomats, contractors and policymakers who reported successes on the ground, rather than the grim reality of a bloody insurgency, according to the watchdog that tracked the collapse of the war for 12 years. had watched.

The result, said one US military adviser, was that the system “became a self-licking ice cream” as more money was committed to justify the billions already spent.

John Sopko, the US special inspector general for Afghanistan reconstruction, will submit his final report later this year.

It will reveal that experts and government officials now believe decisions made as early as 2002 meant the war was doomed to failure.

And it will highlight how American ignorance of Afghan culture, the impact of local corruption, and weak cooperation among U.S. agencies have all contributed to a war effort that has returned the country to the Taliban, at the cost of more than 2,400 American lives and $2 trillion.

Yet, Sopko writes in an op-ed published Thursday in the New York Times, you wouldn’t know that from the optimistic reports of the officers and officials responsible at the time.

“But a perverse incentive drove our system,” he writes.

“To secure promotions and higher salaries, military and civilian leaders felt they had to sell their tours of duty, deployments, programs and projects as successes – even when they were not.

“Leaders tended to report and highlight favorable information while glossing over that which indicated failure. After all, failures do not lead to an ambassadorship or an elevation to general.’

U.S. Marines help a child to safety during the 2021 evacuation at Hamid Karzai International Airport after the Taliban invaded the city in August that year

John F. Sopko, Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, will issue his final report on the U.S. war later this year

The US war in Afghanistan ended in humiliation in August 2021.

Taliban fighters had made rapid advances since President Joe Biden announced he would bring US troops home in April that year, and they quickly stormed into the capital Kabul, dashing Washington’s hopes that the Afghan government could survive without foreign troops bottom was smashed.

Thousands of Afghans and foreign citizens flocked to the capital’s airport seeking safe passage as US diplomats hurried out of their embassy.

Tragedy struck when a suicide bomber killed thirteen American personnel amid the chaos at the airport.

The confused departure cast a black cloud over Biden’s first year in office and undermined his reputation as a foreign policy expert and a safe pair of hands after Donald Trump’s first term.

Those last few weeks showed the futility of American claims that things are moving in the right direction, Sopko says.

“The sudden collapse of the Afghan government and the rise of the Taliban have shown that the United States cannot buy a favorable Afghan perception of the country’s corrupt leadership and government, or of American intentions,” he wrote.

“Yet over the past two decades — and even as the Afghan provinces fell like dominoes in the summer of 2021 — I cannot recall a single senior official telling Congress or the American people that failure was a real possibility.”

Members of the 82nd Airborne Division prepare to leave Kabul in August 2021

Armed Taliban patrol the airport runway, a day after the last US troops left

President Joe Biden on the day he announced the end of the US war in Afghanistan

Instead, he pointed to cases where official spokespersons provided misleading information. He quoted the Pentagon official who said just before the collapse that the government in Kabul had more than 300,000 soldiers and police, despite evidence of thousands of “ghost staff” who existed only on paper so bosses could collect extra salaries.

“Key information for measuring the success of initiatives was – sometimes deliberately – concealed from Congress and the American public, including USAID-funded assessments that found Afghan ministries were unable to manage direct US financial assistance.” , he writes.

“Despite strong efforts by the U.S. bureaucracy to stop us, my office has made such material public.”

He describes how one general said his biggest problem was how to spend the remaining $1 billion of his annual budget in just over a month, in a culture that counted spending as the best measure of success.

“Another official we spoke with said he refused to cancel a multimillion-dollar construction project that field commanders didn’t want because the funding had to be spent,” Sopko wrote. ‘The building has never been used.’

In the meantime, spending continues. Sopko said much was routed through United Nations agencies that lacked transparency and proper oversight.

And last year, his office reported that US-funded partners have paid at least $10.9 million in taxes and fees to Taliban authorities since the withdrawal.