CCitizens of all four nations of the United Kingdom were let down by politicians and officials who failed to prepare properly for a pandemic or other civil emergency. Former British health ministers Jeremy Hunt and Matt Hancock failed to update or improve an inadequate 2011 pandemic strategy that focused on influenza rather than a new virus. What resources were available were “constrained” by funding and were diverted to Brexit planning after 2018. Ministers engaged in groupthink, failing to use outside experts effectively or challenging scientific advice. The possibility of a lockdown was never seriously considered. Nor was enough thought given to the likely impact of a pandemic on vulnerable groups.
These highly critical conclusions from the first module of the Covid inquiry are a milestone in the process of national reckoning led by Heather Hallett. This is the first time that the families of the 230,000 people who have died from Covid have seen their anger at official failings, both before and during the pandemic, endorsed in such an authoritative way.
The six-month period for Lady Hallett to respond to her 10 recommendations creates a tight timeline for the new government and the devolved bodies. A decision by Sir Keir Starmer on whether to adopt her central proposal, for a new, independent statutory body, is expected soon. He is expected to follow up on these and other recommendations, including the creation of a UK Civil Emergency Strategy, to be reviewed every three years.
This report, focused on resilience and preparedness, is the clearest indicator yet of Lady Hallett’s approach to her mammoth task. With eight modules still to go and more to be announced, these findings and recommendations are the first of many. Past mistakes are acknowledged, along with those responsible. The inability of politicians to respond effectively to unfolding events, to change course and to question advice, is particularly worrying. Lady Hallett calls for an end to “the culture of consensus in which orthodoxy becomes entrenched”. But there is more emphasis on systems than on individuals. The focus is on what needs to change and how.
The inquiry process is resource-intensive; the government department tasked with responding has 265 staff. But Lady Hallett is clear that the response from the UK government and the devolved administrations must be swift. Another pandemic is likely in the near to medium term, and another virus could be more infectious and deadly than Covid-19. Unless what went wrong is understood quickly, the opportunity to prevent similar mistakes from being repeated could be lost.
The report acknowledges that health and care systems were operating “close to, or even above, capacity” when the pandemic struck. But while a finding that both were underfunded is implicit in such findings, Lady Hallett steers clear of direct criticism of political decisions about public spending. This has understandably disappointed some members of the Covid-19 Bereaved Families for Justice UK group and other critics of previous governments. But the report is not, and should not be mistaken for, an exoneration. The scale of the issues considered is vast and Lady Hallett is determined that the recommendations of her inquiry must be acted upon. At a time when a new government is facing multiple public policy challenges, including a prison crisis, this pragmatic and purposeful document is a solid building block.