Excerpts of Supreme Court opinions by Sandra Day O’Connor

Following are excerpts from the Supreme Court opinions of Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, who died Friday at the age of 93:

From Florida v. Bostick in 1991, which involved police searches of buses:

“We have held that the Fourth Amendment permits police officers to randomly approach individuals in airport lobbies and other public places to ask them questions and request permission to search their luggage, so long as a reasonable person would understand that he or she could refuse to cooperate . In this case, we need to determine whether the same rule applies to police encounters that occur on a bus.

The mere fact that Bostick did not feel free to leave the bus does not mean that the police arrested him. This court has no authority to prohibit law enforcement practices merely because it finds them distasteful. The Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures; it does not prohibit voluntary cooperation.

The cramped space of a bus is a relevant factor to be taken into account when assessing whether a passenger's consent is voluntary. However, we cannot agree with the Florida Supreme Court that this one factor will be decisive in all cases.”

From Hudson v. McMillian in 1992, regarding excessive force against prisoners:

“This case requires us to decide whether the use of excessive physical force against an inmate can constitute cruel and unusual punishment if the inmate is not seriously injured. We answer that question in the affirmative.

When prison officials use malicious and sadistic violence to cause harm, contemporary standards of decency are always violated. This applies regardless of whether there is any injury. Otherwise, the Eighth Amendment would authorize any physical punishment, no matter how diabolical or inhumane, that inflicts less than an arbitrary amount of injury.

That's not to say that every malicious touch by a prison guard will give rise to a federal action… blows against Hudson, which caused bruising, swelling, dislodged teeth and a cracked dental plate, are not (too insignificant) for Purpose of the Eighth amendment.”

From New York versus the US in 1992, on the limits of Congress's power:

“This case implicates one of our nation's newest public policy problems and perhaps our oldest constitutional law issue. The public policy issue concerns the storage of radioactive waste… The constitutional issue is as old as the Constitution: it consists in distinguishing the appropriate division of powers between the federal government and the states.

We conclude that although Congress has significant power under the Constitution to encourage the States to provide for the disposal of radioactive waste generated within their borders, the Constitution does not provide Congress with the ability to simply compel the States to do so .'

From Harris v. Forklift Systems in 1993, regarding discrimination in the workplace:

“Conduct that is not severe or pervasive enough to create an objectively hostile or offensive work environment – ​​an environment that a reasonable person would find hostile or offensive – falls outside the scope of Title VII. Likewise, if the victim does not subjectively experience the environment as abusive, the conduct has not actually changed the victim's terms and conditions of employment, and there is no violation of Title VII.

But Title VII comes into play before the harassing behavior leads to a nervous breakdown. Discriminatory abuse of the work environment, even if it does not seriously affect employees' psychological well-being, can and often does detract from employees' job performance, discourage employees from staying on the job, or prevent them from advancing their careers.

We therefore believe that the trial court erred in relying on whether the conduct “seriously affects the plaintiff's psychological well-being”… Such an inquiry may unnecessarily focus the fact-finder's attention on concrete psychological harm, an element that Title VII does not require.”

From Davis v. US in 1994, which involved police interrogations:

“In 1981, we ruled that law enforcement officers must immediately stop interrogating a suspect who has clearly stated his right to have counsel present during custodial interrogation.

Of course, when a suspect makes an ambiguous or ambiguous statement, it will often be good police practice for the interrogating officers to clarify whether or not he actually wants a lawyer… But we refuse to adopt a rule requiring officers to ask clarifying questions set. If the suspect's statement is not an unequivocal or ambiguous request for counsel, officers have no obligation to stop questioning him.”

From Vernonia School District v. Acton in 1995, in dissent, regarding drug testing for student athletes:

“Under the reasoning behind today's decision, the millions of these students who participate in interscholastic sports, the overwhelming majority of whom have not given school officials any reason to suspect that they are using drugs at school, are open to an intrusive physical research. …

For most of our constitutional history, mass, suspicionless searches have generally been considered necessarily unreasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. And we have allowed exceptions in recent years only when it was clear that a suspicion-based regime would have no effect. …

Nowhere is it less clear that an individualized suspicion requirement would be ineffective than in the school context. In most schools, the entire group of potential search targets – students – is under constant surveillance by teachers, administrators and coaches, whether in classrooms, hallways or locker rooms. …

There is a substantial basis for concluding that a robust regime of suspicion-based testing … would have gone a long way toward solving Vernonia's school drug problem, while preserving the rights of James Acton and others like him.

From Grutter v. Bollinger from 2003, about affirmative action in higher education:

“While all government uses of race are subject to strict scrutiny, not all of them are invalidated by these uses. As we have explained, “every time the government treats someone unequally because of his or her race, that person has suffered an injury that falls squarely within the language and spirit of the Constitution's guarantee of equal protection”…

…Not every decision influenced by race is equally objectionable and rigorous scrutiny is intended to provide a framework for carefully examining the importance and sincerity of the reasons given by the government decision maker for the use of race in that specific context…

…We have long recognized that, given the important purpose of public education and the extensive freedom of speech and thought associated with the university environment, universities hold a special place in our constitutional tradition… Our conclusion that the Law School One The compelling interest in a diverse student body stems from our belief that achieving a diverse student body is at the core of the Law School's very institutional mission…

…These benefits are significant. As the court emphasized, the Law School's admissions policy promotes “cross-racial understanding,” helps break racial stereotypes and “enables (students) to better understand persons of different races”…

…In addition to the expert studies and reports uncovered during the lawsuit, numerous studies show that student population diversity promotes learning outcomes and “better prepares students for an increasingly diverse workforce and society.” as professionals'. .

…To cultivate a group of leaders with legitimacy in the eyes of the citizens, it is necessary that the path to leadership be visibly open to talented and qualified individuals of every race and ethnicity. All members of our heterogeneous society must have confidence in the openness and integrity of the educational institutions that offer this training. As we have recognized, law schools 'cannot be effective in isolation from the individuals and institutions with which the law interacts'… Access to legal education (and therefore to the legal profession) must be inclusive for talented and qualified individuals of all races and ethnicity, so that all members of our heterogeneous society can participate in the educational institutions that provide the training and education necessary to succeed in America.”

From 2004's Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, on the rights of detainees in the war on terror:

“We have long made it clear that a state of war is not a blank check for the president when it comes to the rights of the country's citizens. … (It) would upend our system of checks and balances if it were to suggest that a citizen could not come to court challenging the factual basis for his detention by his government simply because the executive opposes making such a challenge available. …

Any process in which the executive branch's factual claims are left entirely unchallenged or simply assumed to be correct, without any opportunity for the alleged combatant to demonstrate otherwise, is constitutionally flawed. …

We have no reason to doubt that courts faced with these sensitive cases will give due consideration both to the national security issues that may arise in an individual case and to the constitutional limitations that protect essential freedoms that even in times of security problems remain alive.”

From Kelo et al v. City of New London in 2005, in dissent, taking private property:

“Under the banner of economic development, all private property is now vulnerable to being taken over and transferred to another private owner, so long as it can be upgraded – that is, given to an owner who will use it in a way which the legislator considers better. useful to the public – in the process. By reasoning, as the Court does, that the incidental public benefits arising from the subsequent ordinary use of private property ensure that economic development is put to 'public use', any distinction between private and public use of property is erased – and thus, in effect, the words 'for public use' from the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment…

The specter of condemnation hangs over all property. There's nothing stopping the state from replacing every Motel 6 with a Ritz-Carlton, every house with a shopping center, or every farm with a factory…

Any property can now be taken for the benefit of another private party, but the consequences of this decision will not be arbitrary. The beneficiaries are likely to be citizens with disproportionate influence and power in the political process, including large corporations and development companies. As for the victims, the government is now licensed to transfer property from those with fewer resources to those with more. The Founders could not have intended this perverse outcome. 'That alone is a just government,' wrote James Madison, 'which impartially protects every man his due.'”