Cops who responded to Uvalde school shooting are subpoenaed by Texas grand jury over botched police response that could result in criminal charges after 19 children were slaughtered

Several law enforcement officers who responded to the May 2022 mass shooting at a Uvalde school have been ordered to testify before a grand jury investigating the botched response.

Several officers who responded to Robb Elementary School on May 24, where 19 children were slaughtered, have been subpoenaed for personal testimony that could lead to criminal charges.

A Justice Department report on the shooting released earlier this year found that Uvalde police officers stood outside a classroom for 77 minutes as schoolchildren screamed for “help” after a gunman opened fire.

The officer’s testimony will begin next week at the Uvalde County Courthouse and marks an acceleration of the 21-month criminal investigation.

Members of the Texas Department of Public Safety and local police have been called to testify, with grand jurors possibly having a chance to question the officers themselves.

After gunman Salvador Ramos, 18, burst into Robb Elementary School on the morning of May 24, 2022, the report found that the “most critical tactical failure” was that police did not consider the event “active.”

From that point on, it took 77 minutes for the 376 law enforcement officers to kill Ramos, only after he fatally shot 21 people in several classrooms.

“The response to the May 24, 2022 mass casualty incident at Robb Elementary School was a failure,” the Justice Department report concluded.

One of the tragic conclusions of Thursday’s report was Garland’s admission that the lives of the young victims could have been saved if protocols had been properly followed — a concession that parents say was long overdue.

One of two Uvalde teachers killed in the 2022 mass shooting was left on a walkway to die — while crying, bullet-stricken students were quickly transported onto buses before receiving medical attention, the report also found.

Victims – both adults and children – were frantically dragged from bloody classrooms, with no stretchers available to get them into ambulances.

One teacher died on the walkway before being covered and taken into an ambulance. Another body, taken from the school, was placed outside and then left unattended – while a group of police officers gathered near the school.

Ambulances mistakenly took deceased victims to hospital, others failed to properly secure seriously injured patients on stretchers, and vital blood supplies transported to the scene went unused – despite being needed.

Injured victims were left on stretchers outside Robb Elementary as several medical crews abruptly took and seized their ambulances.

Children – hit and grazed by bullets during the attack on their school – were led on buses to the civic center without being seen by medical staff.

Attorney General Merrick Garland said in a statement: “The victims and survivors of the mass shooting at Robb Elementary School deserved better. “The law enforcement response to Robb Elementary on May 24, 2022 – and the response of officials in the hours and days that followed – was a failure that should not have happened.”

The Ministry of Justice has collected more than 14,100 objects on site for analysis. This included hours of video, photos, 260 interviews, multiple visits to Uvalde, as well as police policies, procedures and training.

Federal officials said their account of the mass shooting was made public “to provide an independent account of law enforcement actions and responses; identify lessons learned and best practices to help first responders prepare for and respond to active shooter events; and provide a roadmap for community safety and engagement before, during and after such incidents.”

KEY CHARACTERS AND THEIR FAILURES

Police Chief Pete Arredondo, Uvalde Police Chief Mariano Pargas and Uvalde County Sheriff Ruben Nolasco were all named in the report.

They arrived on the scene within minutes, but no one took charge of the situation.

Arredondo — who was the de facto commander on the scene — was criticized in the federal report for deliberately not trying to rescue people who were still alive and trapped in the classroom with the shooter.

The report said he: “Recognised the likelihood that there were casualties and decedents in the room with the shooter and deliberately prioritized evacuations over immediate break-in and entry into the room.”

“This is contrary to the principles of active shooter response, which state that the priority is to address and eliminate the threat.”

The federal report also details well-documented communications problems that officials say have hampered the response. This included Arredondo throwing away his radios upon arrival because he didn’t think they were needed.

Although Arredondo attempted to communicate by phone with officers elsewhere in the school hallway, he said they were not allowed to enter the classrooms “because he appeared to believe that other victims should first be removed from nearby classrooms to prevent further injury.”

The damning report summed it up this way: “Chief Arredondo had the necessary authority, training and resources.

“He did not provide appropriate leadership, command and control, nor establish an incident command structure, nor control access to classrooms 111 and 112.”

Sheriff Nolasco was singled out by the DOJ with critical accuracy.

He had vital information about the shooter that he did not share, the report shows.

The DOJ wrote: ‘Sheriff Nolasco did not seek or establish a command post, establish a unified command, share the intelligence he learned from (the shooter’s) family members, nor appoint an intelligence officer to gather intelligence on this subject .

“At one point, Sheriff Nolasco and UPD Acting Chief Pargas were within 10 to 15 feet of each other outside the exterior door of the northwest hallway.

‘However, they did not coordinate with each other and continued to act independently.

“Without proper command and control, a game warden and constable took over roles traditionally performed by an incident commander.

“On the day of the incident, no leader actually questioned the decisions and lack of urgency of UCISD PD Chief Arredondo and UPD Acting Chief Pargas regarding entering classrooms 111/112.”